This paper marks the first attempt at examining the growth performance across Indian states for the 2000s, a period also marked by the global financial crisis. We report four key findings. First, consistent with the fact that the 2000s was the best ever decade for Indian macroeconomic performance, growth increased across almost all major states in 2001-09 compared to 1993-2001 
states-Maharashtra and West Bengal-and provide evidence that suggests a worsening of business climate in West Bengal between 1960 and 1993. But all these papers cover the period until 2000. This paper, to the best of our knowledge, represents the first attempt to compare growth performance across states during the most recent decade, the first of this millennium. We present below some key stylized facts about interstate growth performance and establish their robustness with supporting evidence. In particular, we establish four facts which are then discussed in detail in section 2.
a. Growth in the main states, except three, increased in 2001-09 compared to 1993-2001. b. Despite the strong performance of the hitherto laggard states, we do not find any convergence across states. On the contrary, we find that divergence in the growth performance across states continues. namely that the growth in the share of the working-age group in total population boosts growth of per capita income.
Growth In the 2000s: StyLIzed FActS
Using data on the 21 largest Indian states, we summarize growth patterns across the states during the period of [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . During the period under study, three new states were carved out of three existing states in 2000. These are Jharkhand (out of Bihar), Chattisgarh (out of Madhya Pradesh), and Uttarakhand (out of Uttar Pradesh). State-level domestic product data for the new states prior to 2000 is available only until 1993. The choice of time period under study in this paper is therefore dictated by the availability of data. In those instances when we take the analysis farther back than 1993, we use data for the old (and larger) states. of the richer states, the relationship should be downward sloping. But, as figure 2 shows, richer states on average grew faster so that the inequality across states is actually increasing. We find that far from changing directions the forces of divergence continue. The strong growth performance of the laggard states should not obscure the more general pattern that across the Indian states, namely, that we still do not see the phenomenon of convergence, whereby the poorer states, by virtue of growing faster than the richer states, start catching up with the latters' level of income.
Stylized Fact 1: Growth Increased in Most States
What happens if we change the time period to 1993-2009 to see if there is convergence over a longer period of time? Figure 3 shows us the results. We find that states with a higher per capita income in 1993 grew faster over the next sixteen years. In other words, we do not find any evidence of convergence over a shorter or a longer period.
We formally investigate the question of convergence and divergence in cross-state growth performance by estimating a standard growth convergence regression equation using state-level data. In is positive and statistically significant. If we repeat the estimation for the period of 1993-2001, we again find that the coefficient on the log of initial income per capita is positive and statistically significant (column 3).
Note that the magnitude of divergence has also increased in the oughties relative to the 1990s. The convergence coefficient was 1.1 percent for the latter and 1.7 percent for the former, a difference of almost 55 percent. For two states, Haryana and Assam, the levels of per capita income are different by 1 log point in 2009; the richer state, Haryana, will grow faster on average by 1.7 percent per year. That is a truly striking magnitude of difference. and conditional convergence regressions using both OLS and generalized method of moments (GMM).
Results from this estimation are shown in table 3.
In column 1, we regress the average annual growth rate of income per capita on the log of initial income per capita at the beginning of each period without any state or time-fixed effects and find that the coefficient on the log of initial income per capita is positive and statistically significant showing In columns 4 to 7, we report estimates obtained using difference GMM and system GMM approaches. 6 The significance of the coefficient on the log of income per capita varies with the estimation method used (table 3 and appendix table 3) . Once again what we are most interested in is the coefficient on the interaction of the log of income per capita for each successive period and how it evolves over time.
Except column 6, the coefficient on the interaction of the log of initial income per capita with the decadal dummies is the highest for the most recent period showing that divergence gained further momentum in the 2000s.
7,8
Another way of looking at the divergence across states is to plot the distribution of per capita income overtime. Figure 4A shows the distribution at different times during . Figure 4B shows the distribution without Delhi. The plot confirms that per capita incomes have increased in all states, including the laggard ones. See for example, Bihar (BH) whose per capita income is trending up, but 6. We estimate different specifications for difference and system GMM by using all the lag lengths and the minimum possible lag lengths for instrumenting endogenous variables as well as by collapsing the instrument set and combinations of both. Table 3 reports estimates using different lag lengths (Roodman 2007 ). Appendix table 3 shows estimates obtained by collapsing the instrument (for all the available lag lengths) and the estimates obtained by reducing the lag length and collapsing the instrument set. The two approaches allow controlling for instrument proliferation which overfit the endogenous variables as well as weaken the Hansen test of the joint validity of instruments. The difference GMM specification using only one lag length is not reported as the equation is under-identified. Estimates obtained from difference GMM by collapsing the instruments sets are the same as those without collapsing but are reported in any case.
7. The coefficient on the interaction of initial income with decadal dummies indicate how much more or less divergence there was in any particular decade over and above the average captured in the uninteracted initial income term. So, a positive coefficient on a decadal dummy does not mean that there was divergence in that decade. To ascertain the absolute performance in any decade, we need to add the coefficient on the decadal interaction with the coefficient on the uninteracted income term. When we do this for the 2000s, we see that in columns 2, 6, and 7 of (updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 2007) . 10 The crisis of 2008-10 highlighted the vulnerability that is the flip side of the dynamism that globalization has engendered: Growth declined in India, and capital fled, as in most other countries, albeit to a lesser extent.
But the question remained as to which states were more dependent on foreign markets and hence more susceptible to a downturn as conditions abroad faltered. shows that growth during the pre-crisis and the crisis years were essentially the same. But the question remains if there was any differential in the growth performance across states during the crisis years and which states took a bigger hit. Figure 5 shows that out of 21 states, nine states experienced a slowdown during the crisis years compared to the pre-crisis years, eight states had a higher growth during the crisis years, and the remaining four had nearly the same performance in the crisis years as in the pre-crisis period. Further, we find that states with the highest growth during the pre-crisis years were the ones which registered greater decline in growth during the crisis years (figure 6). Our analysis shows, unsurprisingly, that Karnataka, with Bangalore as the globalized IT-hub of India, fared the worst with a dramatic growth drop of about 4.4 percentage points during the crisis. Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra also saw a decline in growth of about 2 to 3 percentage points. Gujarat and Tamil Nadu experienced smaller declines.
Could it be the case that states that were the most open or globalized before the crisis were affected the most during the crisis? We cannot easily measure the degree to which each state trades internationally 9. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
10. Available at http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html.
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but we can estimate crudely how tradable is the economic profile of each state. Since manufacturing and business services tend to be highly tradable, we use these-specifically, the share of manufacturing and the share of manufacturing and business services in total state output-as proxies for the openness of each state. 11 We then plot this share against the change in growth during the crisis. These plots are shown in figures 7A (where manufacturing share in output is the proxy for openness of a state) and 7B (where the share of manufacturing and business services combined is the proxy for openness). They show a clear negative correlation. Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat are among the most open states and they also experienced the greatest growth declines. In contrast, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, and
Assam, which produce relatively few tradable goods, were the most resilient during the crisis.
12
Of course, there are likely to be a multiplicity of factors at work which precludes drawing any clear causal conclusions, but the simple correlations seem to be consistent with globalization conferring dynamism and stoking growth but at the same time inducing vulnerability. Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that different age groups have different economic behavior and that any discussion of the impact of population growth on economic growth should take into account the changing age structure. According to one estimate, demographic dividend accounted for one-third of the growth in East Asia during 1965-90 (Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000) . Using provincial-level data
Stylized Fact 4: demographic dividend Seems to be disappearing
for 1989 -2004 , Wei and Hao (2010 show that changes in the demographic structure have helped fuel
China's economic growth since 1989.
Demographics affect growth because different age groups exhibit different economic behavior. A higher share of the working-age population has a positive effect on growth through various channels-a higher labor supply on account of an increase in the population, as well as behavioral changes such as increased female labor participation, higher savings as working-age groups tend to save more than the young and the old, and greater investment in education and health as the number of children being raised declines and the lifetime over which the investment can be recouped becomes longer. Thus, a favorable change in the age structure i.e., an increase in the share of the working-age population, as captured by the growth in the share of the working-age population, has the potential to positively influence growth.
11. Business services as defined in the state national accounts include real estate, ownership of dwellings, and business services. Of these, business services includes IT (information technology) and IT enabled services, and is probably the only tradable component. However, due to lack of data at the state level we are unable to use a more disaggregated classification that excludes these potentially non-tradable components.
12. Of course, tradability in this context could refer to domestic or external trade and therefore the drop in growth could be due to fall in either external or domestic demand which we do not distinguish.
Hope in India's future growth is founded on the demographic dividend: A rapidly expanding young population will save more and inject entrepreneurial vigor, lifting the country to a faster growth trajectory.
The demographic dividend is routinely touted by analysts and forecasters as one basis for optimism for India's economic future. And corroborative evidence was provided in two recent papers by Kumar (2010) and Aiyar and Mody (2011) . But the pattern of growth in the 2000s appears to muddy the waters.
The share of the working-age (defined as ages 15 to 59) population in the total population in India has been increasing since the late 1970s. This share is projected to increase from 58.6 percent in 2000 to 63.9 percent in 2035 before it starts trending down. 13 India is thus undergoing changes in the age composition of the population that can help contribute to its growth. Kumar (2010) and Aiyar and Mody (2011), using state-level data for India until 2001, show that there is a positive and statistically significant impact of growth in the share of the working age in total population on growth. Aiyar and Mody (2011) estimate that the demographic divided could add up to 2 percentage points to per capita GDP growth during the next two decades. To test this, we estimate a growth convergence regression augmented with the standard demographic variables (the initial share of the working-age population in total population and the growth in the share of the working-age population). 15 We find that growth in the share of the working-age population is not positively correlated with income growth after controlling for initial income per capita for the period of 2001-09 (columns 1 and 3, table 4). The coefficient on the growth of the share of the working-age population is negative and statistically insignificant after 2001.
However, for the decade of the 1990s, the relationship between the two variables is positive and statistically significant (columns 5 and 6). For the 1980s also we do not find a significant relationship between growth in the share of the working-age population-the key demographic dividend variable-13. Source: World Population Prospects (2010 revision), United Nations. Available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index. htm.
14. Growth in the share of the working-age population in total population for 2001-09 is calculated using projections of state-level populations by age group based on the 2001 Census.
15. The relationship between growth in per capita income and growth in the share of the working-age population and initial share of the working-age population can be derived using the conditional convergence equation specified, for example, in Bloom and Canning (2004) .
and income per capita growth. The estimated coefficient on the growth in the share of the working age population for the decade of the 1990s (from column 5) is 2.85. This figure is comparable to that estimated by Kumar (2010) using a pooled OLS for 1971-2001 (2.53) , and it is also comparable to the estimated figure by by Aiyar and Mody (2011) also using a pooled OLS for 1961-2001 (2.49) . In both cases, the coefficient is found to be statistically significant.
This simple analysis suggests that the so-called demographic dividend was only really strong during the 1990s, and in fact, in the 2000s the relationship has the wrong sign even though it is insignificant. This could be due to the fact that there are significant differences before and after 2001 in the states which see a favorable demographic structure (table 6) In any event, it seems premature to tout the benefits of the demographic dividend.
16. The interaction of the growth in the share of the working-age population with decadal dummies tell us how much more or less was the influence of the changing-age structure in each decade over and above the average captured by the uninteracted growth in the share of the working-age population. A negative coefficient on the interaction does not mean that there was a negative impact in that decade; it only tells us the difference in that decade relative to the average. To obtain the overall impact of the growth in the working-age ratio in any decade, we need to add the coefficient on the interaction for that decade with the coefficient on the uninteracted term. When we do this for the 2000s, we see that in columns 1, 3, and 5, the total effect of the growth in the share of the working-age population is negative. However, in all cases the total effect is statistically insignificant as shown in the last row of table 5 and appendix table 4.
concLuSIon
India's growth has been distinctive in many ways, what one of us has dubbed the "Precocious India"
phenomenon (Subramanian 2007) . It has relied on services rather manufacturing as an engine of growth; growth has been skill intensive rather than intensive in the use of India's abundant factor; India, despite being poor, is exporting skills and technology in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) to countries much richer than itself.
The analysis of growth in the 2000s throws up one more quirk, relating to Kerala. The conventional wisdom is that this state is Scandinavian in its social achievements but sclerotic in its growth performance because of investment-chilling labor laws and strong trade unions. This is reflected in a labor force that has voted with its feet by emigrating to the Middle East. The abiding caricature is of the lazy, argumentative Malayali, discussing Foucault and Gramsci over endless cups of chai while living parasitically off the remittances sent by relatives in exile. However, the data suggest that the conventional wisdom and the caricature are dead wrong. Kerala posted among the highest rates of growth in the 1990s
(4 percent per capita), continued its stellar performance in the go-go 2000s (7.5 percent), and exhibited great resilience during the crisis, experiencing virtually no decline in growth.
India, evidently, is capacious enough to allow both Bania, reforming Gujarat and Marxist, and reform-resistant Kerala to flourish. Or, to put it more honestly, the Indian growth miracle, including the experience of the 2000s, continues to confound. Growth of income per capita Growth of income per capita is the average annual growth over the period concerned. It is calculated as the differential of the logs of income per capita in the two periods divided by the time elapsed between the two periods multiplied by 100. Since we use different numbers for population, growth rates reported here are likely to differ from officially reported growth rates of per capita income and also because growth rates are calculated as log differentials.
Growth in the share of the working-age population to total population Growth in the share of the working-age population to total population is the average annual growth over the period concerned. It is calculated as the differential of the logs of ratio of the working-age population to total population in the two periods divided by the time elapsed between the two periods multiplied by 100. Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. Only the main states are used. New states are combined with the respective state they were created from for the period 2001-09 i.e., the old definition of states is used.
